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In recent years, sharing of security information among organizations, particularly information on both suc-
cessful and failed security breaches, has been proposed as a method for improving the state of cybersecurity.
However, there is a conflict between individual and social goals in these agreements: despite the bene-
fits of making such information available, the associated disclosure costs (e.g., drop in market value and
loss of reputation) act as a disincentive for firms’ full disclosure. In this work, we take a game theoretic
approach to understanding firms’ incentives for disclosing their security information given such costs. We
propose a repeated game formulation of these interactions, allowing for the design of inter-temporal incen-
tives (i.e., conditioning future cooperation on the history of past interactions). Specifically, we show that a
rating/assessment system can play a key role in enabling the design of appropriate incentives for support-
ing cooperation among firms. We further show that in the absence of a monitor, similar incentives can be
designed if participating firms are provided with a communication platform, through which they can share
their beliefs about others’ adherence to the agreement.
Key words : Information sharing agreements, breach disclosure, repeated games, inter-temporal incentives
1. Introduction
Improving the ability of analyzing cyber-incidents, and ensuring that the results are shared among
organizations and authorities in a timely manner, has received increased attention in the recent
years by governments and policy makers, as it can lead to a better protection of the national
infrastructure against potential cyber-attacks, allow organizations to invest in the most effective
preventive and protective measures, and protect consumer rights.
In the US, improving information sharing is listed as one of President Obama’s administration’s
priorities on cybersecurity, and is evidenced by its inclusion as one of the key focus areas in the 2013
Executive Order 13636 on “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (Obama (2013)), and
as initiative #5 in the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) (The White House
(2015b)). Most recently, during the first White House Summit on cybersecurity and consumer
protection, President Obama signed Executive Order 13691 on “Promoting Private Sector Cyber-
security Information Sharing”, encouraging companies to share cybersecurity information with one
another and the federal government (Obama (2015)). Following the executive order, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) has started efforts to encourage the development of Information
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Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) (DHS (2015b)), as well as the Cyber Information
Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) in order to encourage Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements. As of July 2015, 125 such agreements have been placed, with an addi-
tional 156 being negotiated (The White House (2015a)).
In general, depending on the breach notification law or the information sharing agreement, a firm
may be required to either publicly announce an incident, to report it to other firms participating
in the agreement or within its industry sector, to notify affected individuals, and/or to notify the
appropriate authorities. Currently, most of the existing laws in the US and the European Union
require organizations to only report to an authority, with a few other also mandating notification
of the affected individuals; e.g., HIPAA for the health sector in the US (see Laube and Bo¨hme
(2015) for a summary of prominent US and EU laws). However, motivated by the aforementioned
trend in the newest initiatives in the US (in particular, EO 13691), in this paper, we are primarily
interested in information sharing agreements among firms, both with and without facilitation
by an authority. Examples of existing agreements/organizations of this type include Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs),
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and InfraGard. Currently,
joining and reporting in all such information sharing organizations is voluntary.
1.1. Problem Motivation
Several studies have analyzed the positive effects of information sharing laws. Romanosky et al.
(2011) show that the introduction of breach disclosure laws has resulted in a reduction in identity
theft incidents. Gordon et al. (2015) argue that shared information can reduce the uncertainty in
adopting a cybersecurity investment, thus leading firms to take a proactive rather than reactive
approach to security, and consequently increasing the expected amount of investments in cyber-
security. Finally, Gordon et al. (2006) show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (despite only
indirectly encouraging higher focus on reporting of security-related information) has had a positive
effect on disclosure of information security by organizations. Nevertheless, there exist anecdotal
and empirical evidence that security breaches remain under-reported, see e.g., Claburn (2008),
Threat Track (2013).
These observed disincentives by companies for sharing security information can be primarily
explained by analyzing the associated economic impacts. Campbell et al. (2003), Cavusoglu et al.
(2004) conduct event-study analyses of market reaction to breach disclosures, both demonstrating
a drop in market values following the announcement of a security breach. In addition to an initial
drop in stock prices, an exposed breach or security flaw can result in loss of consumer/partner
confidence in a company, leading to a further decrease of revenues in the future (Gal-Or and Ghose
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(2005)). Finally, documenting and announcing security breaches impose a bureaucratic burden
on the company; e.g, when an agreement requires the reports to comply with a certain incident
reporting terminology; examples of such frameworks include the recently proposed categorization
by DHS (DHS (2015a)), and the Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS)
proposed by the Verizon RISK team (Verizon (2015)).
Given these potential disclosure costs, and the evidence of under-reporting of security infor-
mation, it is clear that we need a better understanding of firms’ incentives for participating in
information sharing organizations, as well as the economic incentives that could lead to voluntary
cooperation by firms in these agreements.
1.2. Related Work
A number of research papers have analyzed the welfare implications of information sharing agree-
ments, as well as firms’ incentives for adhering to these agreements.
The work by Ogut et al. (2005) and Laube and Bo¨hme (2015) consider the effects of security
breach reporting between firms and an authority. Ogut et al. (2005) show that if the availability of
shared information1 can reduce either attack probabilities or firms’ interdependency, it will benefit
social welfare by inducing firms to improve investments in self-protection and cyber-insurance. On
the other hand, Laube and Bo¨hme (2015) study the effectiveness of mandatory breach reporting,
and shows that enforcing breach disclosure to an authority (through the introduction of audits
and sanctions) is effective in increasing social welfare only under certain conditions, including high
interdependence among firms and low disclosure costs.
Gordon et al. (2003) and Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) propose game-theoretic models of informa-
tion sharing among firms. Gordon et al. (2003) show that, if security information from a partner
firm is a substitute to a firm’s own security expenditures, then (mandatory) information sharing
laws reduce expenditure in security measures, but can nevertheless increase social welfare. How-
ever, firms will not voluntarily comply with sharing agreements, requiring additional economic
incentives to be in place (e.g., a charge on a member of the ISAC for losses on the other member).
Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) on the other hand allow information sharing to be a complement to the
firm’s own security expenditures, as it may increase consumer confidence in a firm that is believed
to take steps towards securing her system. Using this model, the authors show that when the pos-
itive demand effects of information sharing are high enough, added expenditure and/or sharing by
one firm can incentivize the other firm to also increase her expenditure and/or sharing levels.
1 Firms’ incentives for information disclosure or the mechanisms for ensuring breach disclosure have not been modeled
in Ogut et al. (2005).
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In this work, similar to Gordon et al. (2003), Ogut et al. (2005), Laube and Bo¨hme (2015), we
assume disclosure costs are higher than potential demand-side benefits, therefore similarly predict-
ing a lack of voluntary information sharing at the state of equilibrium. Our proposed approach of
considering the effects of repeated interactions as an incentive solution is however different from
those proposed in aforementioned literature, as they consider one-shot information sharing games.
1.3. Inter-temporal Incentives in Information Sharing Agreements
In this paper, we also take a game-theoretic approach to understand firms’ behavior and
(dis)incentives in security information sharing agreements. This approach is motivated by the fact
that despite the aforementioned disclosure costs (which deter firms from joining such agreements
and sharing their security information), full disclosure has benefits for participating firms, as each
firm can prevent similar attacks and invest in the best security measures by leveraging other firms’
experience. Consequently, an outcome in which firms disclose their information would be preferred
by all participants. There is therefore a conflict between individual interest and societal goals. To
capture this conflict, we model security information sharing agreements as an N-person prisoner’s
dilemma (NPD) game. In an NPD, there will be no information sharing at the state of equilibrium,
as also predicted by similar game-theoretic models which consider one-shot information sharing
games (see Section 1.2). Existing research has further proposed audits and sanctions (e.g. by an
authority or the government) or introducing additional economic incentives (e.g. taxes and rewards
for members of ISACs) as remedies for encouraging information disclosure.
In this paper, we take a different approach and account for the repeated nature of these agree-
ments to propose the design of inter-temporal incentives that lead sufficiently patient firms to
cooperate on information sharing. It is well-known in the economic literature that repetitions of
an otherwise non-cooperative and inefficient game can lead economically rational agents to coordi-
nate on efficient equilibria, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006). The possibility of achieving efficient
outcomes however depends on whether the monitoring of other participants’ actions is perfect or
imperfect, and private or public. In particular, for information sharing games, each firm or an
outside monitor can (at best) only imperfectly assess the honesty and comprehensiveness of the
shared information. Accordingly, we consider two possible monitoring structures for these games.
First, we analyze the role of a rating/assessment system in providing an imperfect public sig-
nal about the quality of firms’ reports in the agreement. We show that for the proposed NPDs
equipped with a simple monitoring structure, the folk theorem of Fudenberg et al. (1994) holds in
the repeated game, therefore making it possible to design appropriate inter-temporal incentives to
support cooperation. We illustrate the construction of these incentives through an example, and
discuss the effect of the monitoring accuracy on this construction. We then consider the design
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of such incentives in the absence of a pubic monitoring system. Specifically, we assume that the
firms have access to a communication platform, through which they are allowed to report their
private beliefs on whether other firms are adhering to the agreement. We show that given a simple
imperfect private monitoring structure by each firm, the folk theorem of Kandori and Matsushima
(1998) will be applicable to our proposed NPDs, again enabling the design of appropriate incentives
for information sharing.
Contributions. The contributions of the current work are therefore the following:
• We propose the design of inter-temporal incentives for supporting cooperative behavior in
security information sharing agreements. To this end, we model firms’ interactions as an N-person
prisoner’s dilemma game and equip it with a simple monitoring structure.
• We illustrate the role of a public rating/assessment system in providing imperfect public
monitoring, leading to coordination on cooperation in information sharing agreements.
• We further establish the possibility of sustaining cooperative behavior in the absence of a
public monitor, by introducing a platform for communication among firms.
Preliminary versions of this work appeared in Naghizadeh and Liu (2016a,b). We first proposed the
idea of using inter-temporal incentives in information sharing agreements in Naghizadeh and Liu
(2016a). We analyzed the possibility of using public monitoring in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma
game in Naghizadeh and Liu (2016b). In the current work, we generalize the model to N-person
prisoner’s dilemma games. We extend our analysis of public monitoring to the general model, and
further analyze the possibility of using private monitoring through an appropriate communication
platform.
Paper Organization. We present the model and proposed monitoring structure for information
sharing games in Section 2. We discuss the role of a monitoring system in the design of inter-
temporal incentives in Section 3, followed by the analysis of providing such incentives based on
private observations and communication among firms in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Information Sharing Game Model
2.1. The Stage Game
Consider N (symmetric) firms participating in an information sharing agreement (e.g. firms within
an ISAC). Each firm can choose a level of expenditure in security measures to protect her infras-
tructure against cyber incidents. Examples include implementing an intrusion detection system,
introducing employee education initiatives, and installing and maintaining up-to-date security soft-
ware. We assume these measures are implemented independently of the outcome of the sharing
agreement, and focus solely on firms’ information sharing decisions.2
2 This assumption is adapted for two reasons. First, this allows us to focus only on firms’ incentives for information
sharing. More importantly, here the information shared by firm i is assumed to be a substitute to firm j’s investment;
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The information sharing agreement requires each firm i to share her security information with
other participating firms. This disclosure can include information on both successful and failed
attacks, as well as effective breach prevention methods and the firm’s adopted security practices. A
firm i should therefore decide whether to fully and honestly disclose such information. We denote
the decision of firm i by ri ∈ {0,1}, with ri = 0 denoting (partially) concealing and ri =1 denoting
(fully) disclosing.3 Denote the number of firms adopting a full disclosure decision of by x; i.e.,
x := |{i| ri = 1}|.
A decision of ri = 1 is beneficial for the following reasons. On one hand, the disclosed information
can allow other firms j 6= i to leverage the acquired information to protect themselves against
ongoing attacks and to adopt better security practices. Aside from this security-related implications,
information disclosure ri =1 may further provide a competitive advantage to firms j 6= i, allowing
a firm j to increase her share of the market by strategically leveraging the attained information
to attract a competitor i’s costumers. Finally, sharing of security information may be beneficial to
firm i herself as well (especially when many other firms are disclosing as well), as it may garner
trust from potential partners and costumers. We denote all such applicable information gains to
a firm, as a function of firm i’s decision and the number of other firms making a full disclosure
decision, by G(r, z) : {0,1} × {0,1, . . . ,N − 1} → R≥0, with G(0,0) = 0. We assume that given r,
G(r, ·) is increasing in z, the number of other firms sharing their information.
Despite the aforementioned benefits of adopting ri = 1, firm i has a disincentive for full disclo-
sure due to the associated costs. These costs includes the man-hours spent in documenting and
reporting security information, as well as potential losses in reputation, business opportunities with
potential collaborators, stock market prices, and the like, following the disclosure of a breach or
existing security flaws. In addition, it may be in i’s interest to conceal methods for preventing
ongoing threats, predicting that an attack on the competitor j will result in j’s costumers switch-
ing to i’s products/services, increasing firm i’s profits. Consequently, such potential market loss
or competitor’s gain in sales can further deter firms from adhering to information sharing agree-
ments. We denote all these associated disclosure costs by L(r, z) : {0,1} × {0, . . . ,N − 1} → R+,
with L(0,0)= 0, where the cost can potentially depend on how many other firms, z, are disclosing
their security information.
i.e., firm j can decrease her security expenditure when she receives information from firm i. This possible reduction
in the positive externality from j’s investments may therefore result in further disincentives for firm i for sharing
her security information. We therefore remove these effects by decoupling the decisions and assuming fixed security
expenditures. Analyzing the interplay of investment and sharing decisions remains a direction of future work.
3 The results and intuition obtained in the following sections continue to hold when firms can choose one of finitely
many disclosure levels, given an appropriate extension of utilities and the monitoring structure.
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We can now define the utility of each user based on her disclosure decision. Given the number
of firms that are sharing, x, and substituting z = x−1{ri = 1} (where 1(·) denotes the indicator
function), we define the following utilities for the cooperators (ri = 1) and deviators (ri = 0):
Cooperator: C(x) :=G(1, x− 1)−L(1, x− 1) ,
Deviator: D(x) :=G(0, x)−L(0, x) .
We impose the following two assumptions on the utility functions:
Assumption 1. Non-cooperation dominates cooperation,
(A1) D(x− 1)>C(x), ∀1≤ x≤N .
Assumption (A1) entails that the disclosure costs outweigh the gain from sharing for the firm,
making ri = 0 a dominant strategy. In other words, the marginal benefit from increased trust or
approval due to disclosure is limited compared to the potential market and reputation loss due
to disclosed security weaknesses. Therefore, the only Nash equilibrium of a one-shot information
sharing game is for no firm to disclose her information. This observation is consistent with similar
studies of one-shot information sharing games in Gordon et al. (2003), Laube and Bo¨hme (2015),
which also conclude that, in the absence of audit mechanisms or secondary incentives, firms will
choose to share no information because of the associated disclosure costs.
Assumption 2. Non-cooperation is inefficient,
(A2) C(N)>D(0)= 0 .
Assumption (A2) entails that the resulting non-disclosure equilibrium is suboptimal, particularly
compared to the outcome in which all firms disclose. That is, full disclosure dominates the unique
Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. We may further be interested in imposing a more restrictive
condition (although this is not necessary for our technical discussion).
(A2’) xC(x)+ (N −x)D(x)> (x− 1)C(x− 1)+ (N −x+1)D(x− 1), ∀1≤ x≤N .
Under (A2’) (which indeed implies (A2)), non-disclosure by any firm decreases social welfare,
making the full disclosure equilibrium x=N the socially desired outcome.
Example 1. Consider the gain functions G(1, z) =G(0, z) = zG and loss functions L(0, z) = 0
and L(1, z) = L. Here, each firm obtains a constant gain G from any other firm who is disclosing
information, and incurs a constant loss L if she discloses herself, both regardless of the number
of other firms making a disclosure decision. It is easy to verify that these functions satisfy (A1).
Furthermore, if G > L
N−1
, assumptions (A2) and (A2’) hold as well. Note also that the 2-player
prisoner’s dilemma can be recovered as a special case when N =2.
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Example 2. Alternatively, consider the gain functions G(1, z) = G(0, z) = f(z)G, where f(·) :
{0, . . . ,N − 1} → R+ is an increasing and concave function, and loss functions L(0, z) = 0 and
L(1, z) =L. The concavity of f(·) implies that as the number of cooperators increases, the marginal
increase in information gain is decreasing due to potential overlap in the disclosed information.
The utilities of cooperators and deviators will be given by:
C(x) = f(x− 1)G−L, and, D(x) = f(x)G .
Assumption (A1) follows. Assumptions (A2) will hold if and only ifG> L
f(N−1)−f(0)
. However, unlike
the previous example, for (A2’) to hold we need additional restrictions beyond that required for
(A2). Specifically, the full disclosure equilibrium will be the optimal solution only if the constants
G and L are such that:
G[(N −x) (f(x)− f(x− 1))+ (x− 1) (f(x− 1)− f(x− 2))]>L,∀x .
The described N -player game with assumptions (A1) and (A2) (or (A2’)) is known as the N -
person Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD) game; see e.g., Bonacich et al. (1976), Goehring and Kahan
(1976). These games are used to model social situations in which there is a conflict between
individual and societal goals; e.g., individual decisions whether to belong to unions, political parties,
or lobbies, and problems of pollution or overpopulation (Bonacich et al. (1976)). The imposed
assumptions then model the intuition that in such situations, any individual has a disincentive
for cooperation, (A1), despite the fact that an outcome in which all cooperate would have been
preferred by each participant, (A2).
2.2. Repeated Interactions and the Monitoring Structure
Throughout the following sections, we are interested in the design of inter-temporal incentives
that can incentivize firms to move away from the one-shot equilibrium of the information sharing
game, and adopt disclosure decisions when they interact repeatedly. Such inter-temporal incentives
should be based on the history of firms’ past interactions. We therefore formalize firms’ monitoring
capabilities, and the ensuing beliefs, of whether other firms are adhering to the information sharing
agreement.
First, note that such monitoring is inevitably imperfect ; after all, the goal of an information
sharing agreements is to encourage firms to reveal their non-verifiable and private breach and
security information. Furthermore, the monitoring can be either carried out independently by the
firms, or be based on the reports of a central monitoring system. We consider both possibilities.
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2.2.1. Imperfect Private Monitoring. First, assume each firm conducts her own moni-
toring and forms a belief on other firms’ disclosure decisions. Specifically, by monitoring firm j’s
externally observed security posture, firm i forms a belief bij about j’s report. We let bij = 1 indi-
cate a belief by firm i that firm j has been honest and is fully disclosing all information, and bij =0
otherwise. In other words, bij = 0 indicates that firm i’s monitoring provides her with evidence that
firm j has experienced an undisclosed breach, has an unreported security flaw, or has fabricated
an incident. Formally, we assume the following distribution on firm i’s belief given firm j’s report:
π(bij |rj) =


ǫ, for bij = 0, rj = 1
1− ǫ, for bij = 1, rj = 1
α, for bij = 0, rj = 0
1−α, for bij = 1, rj = 0
(1)
with ǫ ∈ (0,1/2) and α ∈ (1/2,1). First, note that ǫ is in general assumed to be small; therefore,
if firm j fully discloses all information (rj = 1), firm i’s belief will be almost consistent with the
received information. Intuitively, this entails the assumption that with only a small probability ǫ,
firm i will be observing flaws or breaches that have gone undetected by firm j herself, as internal
monitoring is more accurate than externally available information. On the other hand, firm i has an
accuracy α in detecting when firm j conceals security information (rj = 0). Note that (ǫ= 0, α= 1)
is equivalent to the special case of perfect monitoring.
We assume the evidence available to firm i, and hence the resulting belief bij , is private to firm i,
and independent of all other beliefs. Specifically, bij ,∀i 6= j are i.i.d. samples of a Bernoulli random
variable (with parameter α or ǫ depending on rj).
2.2.2. Imperfect Public Monitoring. Alternatively, consider an independent entity (the
government, a white hat, or a research group), referred to as the monitor, who assesses the com-
prehensiveness of firms’ disclosure decisions, and publicly reveals the results. We assume the dis-
tribution of the beliefs {b01, . . . , b0N} formed by the monitor is:
πˆ({b01, . . . , b0N}|{r1, . . . , rN}) := Π
N
j=1π(b0j |rj) , (2)
where the distributions π(b0j |rj) follow (1), with ǫ and α interpreted similarly. Note that the mon-
itoring technology of the monitor, i.e. (α, ǫ), may in general be more accurate than that available
to the firms.4
4 It is worth mentioning that the binary beliefs are assumed for ease of exposition; the results of the subsequent
sections continue to hold if the monitoring technology has finitely many outputs.
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3. Imperfect Public Monitoring: The Role of Centralized Monitoring
The possibility of public monitoring (either perfect or imperfect) can enable the design of inter-
temporal incentives for cooperation in repeated interactions. With perfect public monitoring, devi-
ations from the intended equilibrium path are perfectly observable by all participants, and can be
accordingly punished. As a result, it is possible to design appropriate punishment phases (i.e., a
finite or infinite set of stage games in which deviators receive a lower payoff) that keep sufficiently
patient players from deviating to their myopic (stage game) best responses. This has led to folk
theorems under perfect monitoring; see e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). With imperfect public
monitoring on the other hand, deviations can not be detected with complete certainty. Neverthe-
less, the publicly observable signals can be distributed so that some are more indicative that a
deviation has occurred. In that case, as players can all act based on their observations of the same
signal to decide whether to start punishment or cooperation phases, despite the fact that punish-
ment phases may still occur on the equilibrium path, it is possible for the players to cooperate to
attain higher payoffs than those of the stage game.
In the remainder of this section, we first formalize the above intuition by presenting some prelim-
inaries on infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, and in particular, the folk
theorem of Fudenberg et al. (1994) for these games. In Section 3.2, we show that this folk theorem
applies to NPD information sharing games with monitoring given by (2).
3.1. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
In this section, we present the folk theorem due to Fudenberg et al. (1994). Consider N rational
players. At the stage game, each player i chooses an action ri ∈Ri. Let r ∈ R :=
∏N
i=1Ri denote
a profile of actions. At the end of each stage, a public outcome b ∈ B is observed by all players,
where B is a finite set of possible signals. The realization of the public outcome b depends on the
profile of actions r. Formally, assume the probability of observing b following r is given by π(b|r).
Let u∗i (ri, b) be the utility of player i when she plays ri and observes the signal b. Note that i’s
utility depends on others’ actions only through b, and thus the stage payoffs are not informative
about others’ actions. The ex-ante stage game payoff for user i when r is played is given by:
ui(r) =
∑
b∈B
u∗i (ri, b)π(b|r). (3)
Let F† denote the set of convex combinations of players’ payoffs for outcomes in R, i.e., the convex
hull of {(u1(r), . . . , un(r))|r∈R}. We refer to F
† as the set of feasible payoffs. Of this set of payoffs,
we are particularly interested in those that are individually rational : an individually rational payoff
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profile v is one that gives each player i at least her minmax payoff vi := minρ−i maxri ui(ri,ρ−i)
(where ρ−i denotes a mixed strategy profile by players other than i). Let ρ
i, with
ρ
i
−i := argmin
ρ
−i
(
max
ri
ui(ri,ρ−i)
)
,
ρii := max
ri
ui(ri,ρ
i
−i) ,
denote the minmax profile of player i, and F∗ := {v ∈F†|vi > vi,∀i} denote the set of feasible and
strictly individually rational payoffs. The main purpose of a folk theorem is to specify which of
the payoffs in F∗ (of which Pareto efficient payoffs are of particular interest) can be supported (as
average payoffs) by some equilibrium of the repeated game.
Let us now discuss the repeated game. When the stage game is played repeatedly, at time t,
each player has a private history containing her own past actions, ht−1i := {r
0
i , . . . , r
t−1
i }, as well as
a public history of the public signals observed so far, ht−1 := {b0, . . . , bt−1}. Player i then uses a
mapping σti from (h
t−1
i , h
t−1) to (a probability distribution over) Ri to decide her next play. We refer
to σi = {σ
t
i}
∞
t=0 as player i’s strategy. Each player discounts her future payoffs by a discount factor
δ. Hence, if player i has a sequence of stage game payoffs {uti}
∞
t=0, her average payoff throughout
the repeated game is given by (1− δ)
∑∞
t=0 δ
tuti. Player is choosing her strategy σi to maximize this
expression.
Among the set of all possible strategies σi, we will consider public strategies: these consist of
decisions σti that depend only on the public history h
t−1, and not on player i’s private information
ht−1i . Whenever other players are playing public strategies, then player i will also have a public
strategy best-response. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public strategies that,
starting at any time t and given any public history ht−1, form a Nash equilibrium of the game
from that point on. PPEs facilitate the study of repeated games to a great extent, as they are
“recursive”. This means that when a PPE is being played, the continuation game at each time
point is strategically isomorphic to the original game, and therefore the same PPE is induced in the
continuation game as well. Note that such recursive structure can not be recovered using private
strategies, leading to the comparatively limited results in private monitoring games, as discussed
in Section 4. Let E(δ) be the set of all payoff profiles that can be attained using public strategies
as PPE average payoffs when the discount factor is δ. We know that E(δ)⊆F∗. The main question
is under what conditions does the reverse hold, i.e., when is it possible to attain any point in the
interior of F∗ as PPE payoffs?
In order to attain nearly efficient payoffs, players need to be able to support cooperation by
detecting and appropriately punishing deviations. In PPEs, where strategies are public, all such
punishment should occur solely based on the public signals. As a result, the public signals should
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be distributed such that they allow players to statistically distinguish between deviations by two
different players, as well as different deviations by the same player. We now formally specify these
conditions. The first condition, referred to as individual full rank, gives a sufficient condition under
which deviations by a single player are statistically distinguishable; i.e., the distribution over signals
induced by some profile ρ are different from that induced by any (ρ′i,ρ−i) for ρ
′
i 6= ρi. Formally,
Definition 1. The profile ρ has individual full rank for player i if given the strategies of the
other players, ρ
−i, the |Ri| × |B| matrix Ai(ρ−i) with entires [Ai(ρ−i)]ri,b = π(b|ri,ρ−i) has full
row rank. That is, the |Ri| vectors {π(·|ri,ρ−i)}ri∈Ri are linearly independent.
The second general condition, pairwise full rank, is a strengthening of individual full rank to pairs
of players. In essence, it ensures that deviations by players i and j are distinct, as they introduce
different distributions over public outcomes. Formally,
Definition 2. The profile ρ has pairwise full rank for players i and j if the (|Ri|+ |Rj |)× |B|
matrix Aij(ρ) := [Ai(ρ−i);Aj(ρ−j)] has rank |Ri|+ |Rj | − 1.
Therefore, given an adequate public monitoring signal, we have the following folk theorem under
imperfect public monitoring.
Theorem 1 (The imperfect public monitoring folk theorem, Fudenberg et al. (1994)).
Assume R is finite, the set of feasible payoffs F† ⊂ RN has non-empty interior, and all the pure
action equilibria leading the extreme points of F† have pairwise full rank for all pairs of players. If
the minmax payoff profile v= (v1, . . . , vN) is inefficient, and the minmax profile ρˆ
i has individual
full rank for each player i, then for any profile of payoffs v ∈ intF∗, there exists a discount factor
δ < 1, such that for all δ ∈ (δ,1), v ∈ E(δ).
3.2. Supporting Cooperation in Information Sharing with Public Monitroring
We now verify that the above folk theorem applies to information sharing games with imperfect
public monitoring sturcutre given by (2). That is, when the firms are sufficiently patient, they
can sustain cooperation on full security information sharing in a repeated setting, by making their
disclosure decisions based only on the imperfect, publicly announced observations of the monitor
about their past actions. To this end, we need to verify that the conditions of the folk theorem,
in particular those on the informativeness of the public monitoring signal, hold for (2). First, note
that the public signal b has 2N possible outcomes; we view each signal as a binary string and
assume the columns of the following matrices are ordered according to the decimal equivalent of
these binary strings.
We first verify that the minmax profile of the repeated information sharing game has individual
full rank for any firm. The minmax action profile for some firm i, rˆi, is all firms concealing their
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information, i.e., rˆi = 0. Consider deviations by firm 1 (by the symmetric nature of the game, the
same argument holds for other firms). Then A1(rˆ
i) is given by:


b= (0,0, . . . ,0) (1,0, . . . ,0) . . . (0,1, . . . ,1) (1,1, . . . ,1)
r1 =0 α
N (1−α)αN−1 . . . α(1−α)N−1 (1−α)N
r1 =1 ǫα
N−1 (1− ǫ)αN−1 . . . ǫ(1−α)N−1 (1− ǫ)(1−α)N−1


The rows of the above matrix are linearly independent (given α 6= ǫ), and hence the minmax profiles
have individual full rank for all firms.
We also need to verify that all pure strategy action profiles have pairwise full rank. We do so
for rk := (1,1, . . . ,1,0,0, . . . ,0), where the first k firms disclose, and the remainder N − k conceal;
other profiles can be shown similarly. For the profile rk, first consider the firms i= 1 and j =N .
The matrix Aij(rk) is given by:


b= (0,0, . . . ,0) (1,0, . . . ,0) . . . (0,1, . . . ,1) (1,1, . . . ,1)
r1 =0 α · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 ·α (1−α) · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 ·α . . . α · (1− ǫ)k−1 · (1−α)N−k (1−α) · (1− ǫ)k−1 · (1−α)N−k
r1 =1 ǫ · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 ·α (1− ǫ) · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 ·α . . . ǫ · (1− ǫ)k−1 · (1−α)N−k (1− ǫ)k · (1−α)N−k
rN =0 ǫ · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 ·α (1− ǫ) · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 ·α . . . ǫ · (1− ǫ)k−1 · (1−α)N−k (1− ǫ)k · (1−α)N−k
rN =1 ǫ · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 · ǫ (1− ǫ) · ǫk−1 ·αN−k−1 · ǫ . . . ǫ · (1− ǫ)k−1 · (1−α)N−k−1 · (1− ǫ) (1− ǫ)k · (1−α)N−k−1 · (1− ǫ)


Note that the rows corresponding to r1 = 1 and rN = 0 are the same: indeed when both firms
follow the prescribed strategy, the distribution of the signals is consistent. It is straightforward to
verify that the above has row rank 3; i.e., removing the common row, the three remaining rows
are linearly independent. As a result, rk has pairwise full rank for firms i= 1 and j =N . A similar
procedure follows for other pairs of firms i, j, the remaining pure action profiles, verifying that all
have pairwise full rank.
We have therefore established the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The conditions of the folk theorem of Section 3.1 hold with the public signals
distributed according to (2). As a result, when the firms are sufficiently patient; i.e., they value the
future outcomes of their information sharing agreement, it is possible for them to nearly efficiently
cooperate on full information disclosure through repeated interactions.
3.3. Constructing Public Strategies: An Example
In this section, we present the process through which equilibrium public strategies leading to
a desired payoff profile are constructed. To simplify the illustration, we consider a two player
prisoner’s dilemma game with payoff matrix given by Table 1.
We first present an overview of the idea behind constructing the equilibrium strategies. The
utility of firms at each step of the game can be decomposed into their current payoff, plus the
continuation payoff; i.e., the expected payoff for the remainder of the game depending on the
observed public monitoring output. Therefore, to achieve an average payoff profile v as equilibrium
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C D
C G−L, G−L −L, G
D G, −L 0, 0
Table 1 Firms’ payoffs in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma game
in the repeated game, the action profile and the continuation payoffs should be selected so as to
maximize firms’ expected payoff.
Formally, we say v is decomposed by r on a set W using a mapping γ :B→W if:
vi = (1− δ)ui(r)+ δE[γi(b)|r]
≥ (1− δ)ui(r
′
i,r−i)+ δE[γi(b)|r
′
i,r−i], ∀r
′
i ∈Ri ,∀i. (4)
Here, the mapping γ determines firms’ continuation payoffs (selected from a set W ) following each
signal b ∈ B. The goal is thus to set W = E(δ) (the set of PPE payoffs), and find appropriate
actions r and mappings γ decomposing (i.e., satisfying (4) for) payoff profiles v ∈ E(δ). We can then
conclude that any payoff profile v for which the above decomposition is possible, will be attainable
as a PPE average payoff, as we can recursively decompose the selected continuation payoffs on
E(δ) as well. This procedure thus characterizes the set of payoffs that can be attained using public
strategies.
However, the set of decomposable payoffs on arbitrary sets W is in general hard to characterize;
let’s instead consider the simpler decomposition on half-spacesH(λ,λ ·v) := {v′ ∈RN : λ ·v′ ≤ λ ·v}.
With W =H(λ,λ ·v), (4) can be re-written as:
vi = ui(r)+E[γ¯i(b)|r] ≥ ui(r
′
i,r−i)+E[γ¯i(b)|r
′
i,r−i], ∀r
′
i ∈Ri ,∀i ,
and, λ · γ¯(b)≤ 0, ∀b∈B , (5)
where γ¯ :B→RN , and γ¯i(b) =
δ
1−δ
(γi(b)−vi). We refer to x as the normalized continuation payoffs.
It can be shown (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006)) that characterizing the set of attainable
PPE payoffs E(δ) is equivalent to finding the maximum average payoffs that can be decomposed
on half-spaces using different actions r and in various directions λ. We therefore first find the
maximum average payoffs v enforceable on half-spaces (i.e, satisfying (5), and with λ · γ¯(b) = 0
whenever possible), for each action profile r and direction λ. We will then select the best action
r for each direction, and finally take the intersection over all possible directions λ to characterize
E(δ).5
5 Define k∗(λ;r) := λ · v¯, where v¯ is the maximum payoff profile satisfying (5). It can be shown that k∗(λ;r)≤ λ ·u(r),
and so the maximum is attained when r is orthogonally enforced (whenever possible); i.e., λ · γ¯(b) = 0 in (5). Let
k∗(λ) = sup
r
k∗(λ;r). Intuitively, k∗(λ) is a bound on the average payoff for firms for which the incentive constraints
are satisfied. Let H∗(λ) :=H(λ,k∗(λ)) be the corresponding maximal half-space. Then, that the set of PPE payoffs
is contained in the intersection of these maximal half-spaces; i.e., E(δ)⊆∩λH
∗(λ) :=M, and that the reverse is also
true for sufficiently large δ; i.e, limδ→1 E(δ)=M. We refer the interested reader to Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for
more details.
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We now find the average payoffs decomposable on half-spaces for the prisoner’s dilemma game
in Table 1. Let us first consider profile r= (1,1),6 and an arbitrary direction λ= (λ1, λ2). Setting
λ · γ¯(b) = 0, (5) reduces to:
G−L=G−L+
(
ǫ2γ¯1(0,0)+ ǫ(1− ǫ)γ¯1(0,1)+ (1− ǫ)ǫγ¯1(1,0)+ (1− ǫ)
2γ¯1(1,1)
)
≥ G +(ǫαγ¯1(0,0)+α(1− ǫ)γ¯1(0,1)+ (1−α)ǫγ¯1(1,0)+ (1− ǫ)(1−α)γ¯1(1,1))
and ,
G−L=G−L+
(
ǫ2γ¯2(0,0)+ ǫ(1− ǫ)γ¯2(0,1)+ (1− ǫ)ǫγ¯2(1,0)+ (1− ǫ)
2γ¯2(1,1)
)
≥ G +(ǫαγ¯2(0,0)+ ǫ(1−α)γ¯2(0,1)+ (1− ǫ)αγ¯2(1,0)+ (1− ǫ)(1−α)γ¯2(1,1))
and ,
λ1γ¯1(b)+λ2γ¯2(b) = 0, ∀b∈B .
Substituting for γ¯2(b) using the last equation, and writing the inequalities as equalities, finding the
normalized continuation payoffs is equivalent to solving the following system of equations:


ǫ2 ǫ(1− ǫ) (1− ǫ)ǫ (1− ǫ)2
αǫ α(1− ǫ) (1−α)ǫ (1−α)(1− ǫ)
ǫ2 ǫ(1− ǫ) (1− ǫ)ǫ (1− ǫ)2
αǫ (1−α)ǫ α(1− ǫ) (1−α)(1− ǫ)




γ¯1(0,0)
γ¯1(0,1)
γ¯1(1,0)
γ¯1(1,1)


=


0
−L
0
Lλ2
λ1


.
The first and third rows represent the same equations (corresponding to the equilibrium outcome).
Removing the third row and performing row-reduction on the remaining matrix, the continuation
payoffs should satisfy the following set of equations:
ǫγ¯1(0,0)+ (1− ǫ)γ¯1(0,1)=
−L
ακ
1− ǫ
ǫ
ǫγ¯1(1,0)+ (1− ǫ)γ¯1(1,1)=
L
ακ
−γ¯1(0,1)+ γ¯1(1,0)=
L
ǫακ
(
λ2
λ1
+1) ,
where κ := 1−ǫ
ǫ
− 1−α
α
> 0. The above is an underdetermined system, and thus has infinitely many
solutions depending on the designer’s choice of continuation payoffs. We construct and interpret
one such possibility.
Let’s set γ¯1(1,1) = 0, implying γ¯2(1,1) = 0 as well. This means if the signal indicates that both
firms are cooperating with high probability, there is no need for punishments, so both firms expect
their continuation payoff to remain unchanged (i.e., equal to their current payoff). Given this
choice, we can solve for the remaining normalized continuation payoffs, illustrated in Table 2.
6 Note that decomposing using (0,0) is not considered as it leads to the maximal half-space R2. It thus provides no
information on the set of attainable payoffs as we already know that E(δ)⊆R2.
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γ¯1(b) γ¯2(b)
b=(0,0) L
ǫακ
1−ǫ
ǫ
(λ2
λ1
− 1) L
ǫακ
1−ǫ
ǫ
(λ1
λ2
− 1)
b=(0,1) −λ2
λ1
L
ǫακ
L
ǫακ
b=(1,0) L
ǫακ
−λ1
λ2
L
ǫακ
b=(1,1) 0 0
Table 2 An example of normalized continuation payoff choices.
Intuition. These normalized continuation payoffs can be intuitively interpreted as follows. Fix
a direction with λ1, λ2 > 0 (similar interpretations follow for other directions). Then, given a signal
b= (1,0), which is more likely under a deviation by firm 2, firm 1 expects a higher continuation
payoff (γ¯1(1,0) > 0), while the suspect deviator expects a lower one (γ¯2(1,0) < 0).
7 A similar
intuition applies to the continuations under the signal (0,1). On the other hand, with b= (0,0),
either firm 1 or 2 will be punished, depending on the direction λ. Specifically, for a direction
λ1 = λ2, neither firm expects a change in her continuation payoff. Note that with λ1 = λ2, the
change in continuation payoffs between the outcomes (0,1) and (1,0), as well as among firms in
either outcome, are also of equal size. Note also that both firms are never punished simultaneously
under any outcome, so as to maintain a high average payoff.
Finally, it is worth noting the effect of the monitoring accuracy, α and ǫ, on the normalized
continuation payoffs. Consider direction λ1 = λ2 = 1, and fix L= 1. First, note that ǫακ = α(1−
ǫ)− ǫ(1−α) is increasing in α and decreasing in ǫ. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows the
dependence of γ¯1(1,0) on the monitoring parameters. As a result, as the monitoring technology
becomes more accurate, i.e., α increases and/or ǫ decreases, the size of the normalized continuation
payoffs for firms, when (1,0) or (0,1) is observed, becomes smaller. This is because, as monitoring
becomes accurate, signals indicating deviations (despite equilibrium being played) are more likely to
be due to monitoring errors rather than actual deviations, and therefore the required continuation
punishments/rewards become less severe to maintain firms’ average payoff high.
We conclude that in general, using the described procedure, we can decompose payoff profiles
in the half-spaces H(λ,k∗(λ, (1,1))), where k∗(λ, (1,1)) = λ · u(1,1) = (G−L)(λ2 + λ1), using the
action profile r= (1,1) and continuation payoffs determined as above. Using a similar procedure,
the corresponding half-spaces for the remaining action profiles will have k∗(λ, (0,1)) =Gλ1−Lλ2
and k∗(λ, (1,0))=Gλ2−Lλ1.
7 It is worth emphasizing that due to the equilibrium construction, firms are both playing ri = 1; nevertheless,
punishments on the equilibrium path happen due to the imperfection of monitoring.
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Figure 1 γ¯1(1,0)
We next choose, for a given direction λ, the action for which the corresponding half-spaces covers
a larger set of average payoffs; i.e, k∗(λ) = maxr{Gλ2 −Lλ1,Gλ1−Lλ2, (G−L)(λ1 + λ2)}; which
leads to:
k∗(λ) =


Gλ2−Lλ1 λ2 ≥
G
L
λ1
(G−L)(λ1+λ2)
L
G
λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤
G
L
λ1
Gλ1−Lλ2 λ1 ≥
G
L
λ2
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the intersection of half-spaces H(λ,k∗(λ)), as λ ranges
over R2, is equivalent to the set of feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs of the two-
person prisoner’s dilemma game of Table 1. That is, it is possible to find an action profile r and the
corresponding continuation payoff mapping γ (constructed as described above), so as to incentivize
any feasible strictly individually rational payoff profile.
4. Imperfect Private Monitoring: The Role of Communication
In this section, we consider the use of private monitoring in providing inter-temporal incentives
for information sharing. Unlike repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, relatively less is
known about games with private monitoring (Kandori (2002)).
In particular, we are interested in a folk theorem for this repeated game; i.e., a full charac-
terization of payoffs that can be achieved when firms only have private observations, if firms are
sufficiently patient. As discussed in Section 3, with imperfect public monitoring, Fudenberg et al.
(1994) present a folk theorem under relatively general conditions. The possibility of this result
hinges heavily on that firms share common information on each others’ actions (i.e., the public
monitoring outcome), as a result of which it is possible to recover a recursive structure for the
game, upon which the folk theorem is based. However, a similar folk theorem with private moni-
toring remained an open problem until recently,8 mainly due to the lack of a common public signal.
8 A recent advance in the field is by Sugaya (2011, 2013), who presents a folk theorem for repeated games with
imperfect private monitoring, without requiring cheap talk communication or public randomization. We however
analyze the application of a folk theorem using communication, to draw a closer parallel with the public monitoring
structure of the previous section.
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Nevertheless, the possibility of cooperation, and in particular folk theorems, have been shown to
exist for some particular classes of these games. Examples include:
• Games in which firms are allowed to communicate (cheap talk) after each period. This approach
has been proposed in Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), and in essence, uses the
signals collected through communication as a public signal, allowing participants to coordinate on
cooperation.
• Games in which firms have public actions (e.g., announcement of sanctions) in addition to
private decisions (here, disclosure decisions), as proposed by Park (2011) for the study of inter-
national trade agreements. Intuitively, public actions serve a similar purpose as communication,
allowing participants to signal the initiation of punishment phases.
• Games with almost public monitoring, i.e., private monitoring with signals that are sufficiently
correlated. With such signals, Mailath and Morris (2002) proves a folk theorem for almost-perfect
and almost-public monitoring.
In this section, we present the folk theorem with private monitoring and communication due to
Kandori and Matsushima (1998) in Section 4.1, and in Section 4.2, verify that it applies to NPD
information sharing games with monitoring given by (1).
4.1. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Monitoring and Communication
In this section, we describe the folk theorem with imperfect private monitoring, allowing for com-
munication between players, due to Kandori and Matsushima (1998).
The stage game is similar to the setup of Fudenberg et al. (1994) in Section 3.1. Consider N
rational players. At the stage game, each player i chooses an action ri ∈Ri. Let r ∈R :=
∏N
i=1Ri
denote a profile of actions. At the end of each stage, each player privately observes an outcome
bi ∈ Bi, where Bi is a finite set of possible signals. The probability of observing the profile of
private signals b∈B :=
∏N
i=1Bi following r is given by the joint distribution π(b|r). Assume π has
full support; i.e., π(b|r)> 0, ∀b,∀r. Let u∗i (ri, bi) be the utility of player i when she plays ri and
observes the signal bi. Note that i’s utility depends on others’ actions only through bi, and thus
the stage payoffs are not informative about others’ actions. The expected stage game payoff for
user i when r is played is therefore given by:
ui(r) =
∑
b∈B
u∗i (ri, bi)π(b|r). (6)
The definition of the minmax action profiles ρi and the set of feasible and strictly individually
rational payoffs F∗ ⊂RN is the same as those in Section 3.1. However, in addition to the private
nature of signals bi, the current model differs from the setup in Section 3.1 in that we allow the
players to communicate in this game. Formally, after choosing the action ri and observing the
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signal bi, each player i will publicly announce a message mi ∈Mi, selected from the finite set of
possible messages Mi. Let M =Π
N
i=1Mi.
Consequently, the strategy si = (ri,mi) of each player consists of both an action ri and a message
mi. In particular, when the game is played repeatedly often, the strategy specifies a choice for each
time step t; i.e, ri = (ri(t))
∞
t=0 and mi = (mi(t))
∞
t=0, where:
ri(t) :R
t−1
i ×B
t−1
i ×M
t−1→∆(Ri) ,
mi(t) :R
t
i ×B
t
i ×M
t−1→∆(Mi) .
Let rti = (ri(0), . . . , ri(t)). Define b
t
i and m
t similarly. Then, the private history of player i at
the end of time t is given by hti := (r
t
i , b
t
i), and the public history is h
t :=mt. Therefore, players’
strategies depend on both private and public histories. Given the strategy profiles s= (s1, . . . , sN),
and assuming that players discount future payoffs by a discount factor δ, a player’s average payoff
throughout the repeated game is given by (1− δ)
∑∞
t=0 δ
tui(s(t)). Each player i is choosing her
strategy si to maximize the expected value of this expression.
We are interested in characterizing the payoffs attainable by the strategy profiles s that are
a sequential equilibrium of the game. Formally, s is a sequential equilibrium of the game if for
every player and her history (hti, h
t), si|(ht
i
,ht) is a best reply to E[s−i|ht
−i
,ht |h
t
i]. That is, a player is
best-responding according to her belief over private histories of other players, in particular those
which are consistent with her own private history. Let V (δ) denote the set of sequential equilibrium
average payoffs when the discount factor is δ. We are interested in identifying conditions under
which V (δ)⊆F∗.
Recall that in the game of imperfect public monitoring, conditioning of strategies on the publicly
observed signal allowed players to coordinate, and to recover a recursive structure in the game.
The possibility of communication allows for recovering a similar recursive structure in games with
private monitoring. The equilibrium strategies leading to nearly efficient payoffs will be constructed
as follows. At the end of each period t, each player i is asked to report her privately observed
signal as her message; i.e, mi(t) = bi(t). To make sure that players truthfully report their signals,
the equilibrium strategies use this private information to determine other players’ deviations and
future payoffs, and maintain i’s payoff independent of her report. As a result, truthful reporting
of privately observed signals will be a (weak) best-response.910 It remains to ensure, following a
9 It is also possible to make truth reporting a strict best-response if players’ privately observed signals are mutually
correlated; see (Kandori and Matsushima 1998, Section 4.2).
10 Note that unlike Section 3, each player will be playing a private strategy at equilibrium, as she is using her private
information as her message mi. However, the choice of action ri will be based only on the public information; i.e.,
the disclosed messages available to all players.
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rationale similar to the folk theorem of Section 3.1, that the available signals are informative enough,
in the sense that they allow players to distinguish between different deviations of individuals, and
to differentiate among deviations by different players.
The required conditions on the informativeness of the players’ signals are as follows. First, define
the following vectors:
p−i(r) := (π−i(b−i|r))b−i∈B−i ,
p−ij(r) := (π−ij(b−ij |r))b−ij∈B−ij
Qij(r) := {p−ij(r−i, r
′
i)|r
′
i ∈Ri\{ri}} ,
where B−i := Πk 6=iBk, B−ij := Πk 6=i,jBk, and π−i and π−ij are marginal distributions of the joint
distribution π(b|r) of privately observed signals. The three sufficient conditions on signals can be
expressed accordingly.
Condition 1 At the minmax strategy profile of a player i, ρˆi, for any player j 6= i and any mixed
strategy ρ′j ∈∆(Rj), either
(i) p−j(ρˆ
i) 6= p−j(ρˆ
i
−j, ρ
′
j) or,
(ii) p−j(ρˆ
i) = p−j(ρˆ
i
−j, ρ
′
j) and uj(ρˆ
i)≥ uj(ρˆ
i
−j, ρ
′
j).
Condition (C1) states that at the minmax profile of any player, a deviation by another player is
either statistically distinguishable, and if not, it reduces the payoff of the deviator, and is hence not
profitable. This assumption ensures that we can provide incentives to players to punish (minmax)
one another. Note that this requirement is similar to (but weaker than) the individual full rank
condition in the folk theorem of Section 3.1.
Condition 2 For each pair of players i 6= j, and each pure action equilibrium r leading to an
extreme point of the payoff set F†, we have:
p−ij(r) /∈ co(Qij(r)∩Qji(r)) ,
where co(X) denotes the convex hull of the set X.
Recall that Qij(r) denotes the vector of distribution of beliefs of players other than i and j,
when player i is deviating. (C2) therefore requires that a deviation by either i or j (but not both)
is statistically detected by the remaining players.
Condition 3 For each pair of players i 6= j, and each pure action equilibrium r leading to an
extreme point of the payoff set F†, we have:
co(Qij(r)∪ p−ij(r))∩ co(Qji(r)∪ p−ij(r)) = {p−ij(r)} .
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Finally, (C3) requires that players other than i, j can statistically distinguish deviations by i
from deviations by j, as the resulting distribution on b−ij will be different under either player’s
deviation. In other words, the only consistent distribution arises when neither player is deviating.
It is worth mentioning that (C2) and (C3) hold when the pairwise full rank condition of the folk
theorem in Section 3.1 holds.
Therefore, given adequate private monitoring signals and communication, we have the following
folk theorem under imperfect private monitoring.
Theorem 2 (The Imperfect private monitoring with communication folk theorem).
[Kandori and Matsushima (1998)] Assume that there are more than two players (N > 2),
and the set of feasible and strictly individual rational payoffs F∗ ⊂ RN has non-empty interior
(and therefore dimension N). Then, if the monitoring of players satisfy conditions (C1), (C2),
and (C3), any interior payoff profile v ∈ intF∗ can be achieved as a sequential equilibrium average
payoff profile of the repeated game with communication, when δ is close enough to 1.
4.2. Supporting Cooperation in Information Sharing with Private Monitoring and
Communication
We now verify that the above folk theorem applies to information sharing games with imperfect
private monitoring structure given by (1). That is, when the firms are sufficiently patient, they
can sustain cooperation on full security information sharing in a repeated setting, by truthfully
revealing their private signals, and making their disclosure decisions based only on the imperfect,
publicly announced collective observation about their past actions. To this end, we need to verify
that the three conditions of the folk theorem on the informativeness of the monitoring signal hold
for the joint distribution of the private signals in (1). However, note that once these signals are
truthfully reported, it is as if we have access to N − 1 independent realizations of the public
monitoring distribution in (2). Assume that to test the conditions of the folk theorem, we randomly
choose one of the available cross-observations about a possible deviator (from all players other than
the suspect for (C1), or other than the two suspects for (C2) and (C3)) and test the statistical
distinguishability of the signal. With this method, the joint distribution of the private signal that
is being tested will be equivalent to the public monitoring distribution of (2).
On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 4.1, the conditions of the folk theorem for imperfect
private monitoring are weaker than the full rank conditions required by the folk theorem with
imperfect public monitoring: (C1) is a weaker condition than individual full rank, and (C2) and
(C3) are weaker versions of pairwise full rank. This is because the individual and pairwise full rank
conditions require linear independence of their corresponding signal distributions, while (C1)-(C3)
are stated in terms of convex combinations. As shown in Section 3.2, the distribution in (2) satisfies
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the full rank conditions, and consequently, the joint private distribution resulting from (1) satisfies
(C1)-(C3). We have therefore established the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The conditions of the folk theorem of Section 4.1 hold with private monitoring
(1) and communication. As a result, when the firms are sufficiently patient, i.e., they value the
future outcomes of their information sharing agreement, and are allowed to communicate their
private signals, it is possible for them to nearly efficiently cooperate on full information disclosure
through repeated interactions.
5. Conclusion
We modeled information sharing agreements among firms as an N-person prisoner’s dilemma game,
and equipped it with a simple binary monitoring structure. We proposed a repeated-game approach
to this problem, and discussed the role of monitoring (private vs. public) on determining whether
inter-temporal incentives can lead to the support of cooperation (i.e., full disclosure). Specifically,
we showed that a rating/monitoring system can play a crucial role in providing a common public
signal which, despite being imperfect, can be used to design inter-temporal incentives that lead
firms to cooperate on information sharing. We also showed that in the absence of a monitor, if the
firms are provided with a platform to communicate their privately observed beliefs on each others’
adherence to the agreement, it is again possible to design similar inter-temporal incentives.
An important requirement for the folk theorem, and consequently the design of inter-temporal
incentives, is to ensure that firms are sufficiently patient (i.e., they place significant value on their
future interactions), as characterized by having discount factors higher than δ. Despite the fact
that the proposed binary monitoring structures in (1) and (2) are informative enough for the
folk theorem to hold, their accuracy, (α, ǫ), will impact the requirement on firms’ patience, δ.
Characterizing the dependence of δ on (α, ǫ) is a main direction of future work. Particularly, we
have only considered one method for using firms’ communication of their privately observed signals
to establish the folk theorem of Section 4.1. Determining the optimal method for combining firms’
inputs to ensure the lowest δ remains an interesting question.
Another possible direction is to consider the design of inter-temporal incentives when both types
of public and private monitoring are available. It is indeed still possible to have firms coordinate
based on the public monitoring system’s report alone (i.e., use public strategies); nevertheless, it
may also be possible to employ private strategies, in which firms use both their own observations,
as well as the public signal. Private strategies may lead to higher payoffs than those attainable
through public strategies alone (Mailath and Samuelson 2006, Chapter 10), thus making their
study of interest to either lower the required discount factor, or when the monitoring signals are
not informative enough for a public monitoring folk theorem to hold.
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Finally, we have assumed that the monitoring, as well as its accuracy, are fixed and available
to firms at no additional cost. Analyzing the effects of costly monitoring on firms’ incentives is
another direction of future work.
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